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Abstract: Secure management of Australia's commercial critical infrastructure presents ongoing challenges to 
owners and the government. Although managed via a high-level information sharing collaboration of government 
and business, critical infrastructure protection is further complicated by the lack of a lower-level scalable model 
exhibiting its various levels, sectors and sub-sectors. This research builds on the work of Marasea (2003) to 
establish a descriptive critical infrastructure model and also considers the influence and proposed modelling of 
critical infrastructure dependency inter-relationships. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 2004 Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey (AusCERT 2004), a comparative annual 
financial loss analysis of reported electronic attacks and how differing organisations performed in 
relation to Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) versus non-CNII organisations identified 
that 14% of the organisations surveyed indicated they were unaware of their status of criticality within 
the CNII. The question then arises of, how commercial organisations can identify their criticality status 
and positioning within Australia's critical infrastructure hierarchy. 
Organisational ignorance of criticality status could potentially undermine the reliability and security of 
Australia's CNII, as these organisations are utilising the national information infrastructure (Nil) 
without realising their risk liability. Additionally, other interconnected organisations and infrastructures 
are further exposed to potential usability problems and security risks through the influence of 
dependency relationships between infrastructures on the continued availability of infrastructure 
services, thereby threatening the very stability of both the underlying information infrastructure 
systems within organisations and those external. (AusCERT 2004). 
To address this organisational knowledge gap, it is proposed to develop a scalable descriptive model 
encompassing Australia's entire critical infrastructure. This will clearly establish boundaries between 
differing levels of infrastructure and thus enable an organisation to determine their place within the 
national critical infrastructure hierarchy, identify their security obligations and responsibilities, define 
their deSignated physical and digital boundaries and distinguish 'the specific connection points 
between infrastructures. 
After developing the model, it will also be necessary to determine an illustrative method for 
representing identified dependency relationships between critical infrastructures to illustrate their 
existence, their type and influence upon related infrastructures. 
Initially, it is necessary to critique Australia's critical infrastructure protection program, to further assist 
in developing a descriptive model of the critical infrastructure that will both compliment and build upon 
the current security management paradigm of Australia's critical infrastructure protection. 
2. Australia's critical infrastructure 
Historically, much of Australia's infrastructure was originally owned and operated by the public sector 
at the federal, state and local government levels (Smith 2004). However the majority of Australia's 
critical infrastructure has been privatised and is under private sector ownership. Consequently, 
protecting Australia's critical infrastructure now requires a high level of cooperation between all levels 
of government and the private sector owners. Hence, the federal government has developed a policy 
for critical infrastructure protection that focuses broadly on addressing the following strategies 
(Australian Government 2004): 
• Distinguishing critical infrastructures and ascertaining the areas risk; 
249 
4th European Conference on Information Warlare and Security 
• Aligning the strategies for reducing potential risk to critical infrastructure; 
• Encouraging and developing effective partnerships with state and territory governments and the 
private sector; 
• Advancing both domestic and international best practice for critical infrastructure protection. 
Consequently, a national strategy for critical infrastructure protection over the next three to five years 
has been produced by the federal government to articulate an overarching statement of critical 
infrastructure protection principles and responsibilities that are applicable to all infrastructure 
stakeholders (AGO 2004). 
2.1 Our national critical infrastructure protection strategy 
The national strategy for critical infrastructure protection was formally adopted in March 2004 (Booth 
2004) and is based on a coordinated and cooperative 'committee-like' approach to the protection of 
critical infrastructure. This requires the proactive engagement of infrastructure owners, operators, 
regulators, professional bodies and representative industry bodies, all levels of government and the 
public. To this end, the strategy outlines nine guiding principles central to the protection of Australia's 
critical infrastructure (AGO 2004): 
• Minimising risk to public health, safety and confidence, maintain economic security and 
international competitiveness and ensure continuity of government and its services; 
• Identify critical infrastructures and identify potential vulnerabilities, interdependencies and prepare 
and protect them from hazards; 
• Utilise appropriate risk management techniques to establish relative criticality, level of protection 
required, priority for resource allocation and the application of effective mitigation strategies for 
business continuity; 
• The onus for the management of risk within physical facilities, supply chains, information 
technologies and communication networks resides with the owners and operators; 
• Critical infrastructure protection should be considered from the 'all hazards approach' [sic] that 
accommodates interdependencies between business, sectors, jurisdictions and government 
agencies; 
• A consistent and cooperative partnership between the owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure and the government is paramount to/for effective protection; 
• Effective protection and better risk management will be further enhanced by effective sharing of 
information relating to threats and vulnerabilities between government and the owners and 
operators; 
• Information of any national security threats to critical infrastructure, must be handled carefully and 
responsibly to avoid creating undue concern within the domestic community, tourists and overseas 
investors; 
• Encourage further research and analysis of risk mitigation strategies that can be tailored to 
Australia's unique critical infrastructure context. 
These nine principles provide a broad commonality of understanding for risk management and 
protective obligations between critical infrastructure stakeholders and Australia's national strategy. 
This is applicable to an expansive area across a number of differing economic sectors that critical 
infrastructure supports, such as banking and finance, transport and distribution, energy supplies, 
utilities, health, food supply and communication, as well as government services and national icons 
(AGO 2004). The following Table 1 from the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) identifies 
these sectors and sub sectors as representing Australia's critical infrastructure (NCTC 2004): 
Table 1: NCTC CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Sectors Sub Sectors 
Energy Gas, Petroleum Fuels, Electricity Generation and Transmission 
Utilities Water, Waste Water and Waste Management 
Transport Air, Road, Sea, Rail and Inter-modal (cargo distribution centres) 
Communications Telecommunications (phone, fax, Internet, cable satellites), Electronic Mass 
Communication and Postal SeNices. 
Health Hospitals, Public Health and Research and Development Laboratories 
Food Supply Bulk Production, Storage and Distribution 
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Finance Banking, Insurance, and Trading Exchanges 
Government Defence and Intelligence Facilities, House of Parliament, Key Government 
Services Departments, Foreign Missions, Key residences, Emergency Services (Police, Fire, 
Ambulance and others) and Nuclear Facilities 
National Icons Buildings, Cultural , Sportand Tourism 
Essential Defence Industry, Heavy Industry and Chemicals 
Manufacturing 
While some sectors are not strictly regarded as being within the defined scope of critical 
. infrastructure, the federal government maintains that connective networks or supply chains that 
deliver essential products and services are strategiC parts of the overall critical infrastructure. This is 
due to their . dependence on the availability of other infrastructure sectors to provide continuity of 
supply (AGO 2004). 
Therefore the Australian government has formed the Trusted Information Sharing Network to 
coordinate and manage security information sharing and the protection of all identified critical 
infrastructures (AGO 2004). 
2.2 Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) 
The formation of the TISN provides a forum to encourage information sharing partnerships between 
business and the federal government on significant security issues (AGO 2004). Walker (2004) 
intimates that the TISN web portal provides a direct link between Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) and business leaders to exchange information and coordinate existing 
strategies, plans and procedures that necessitate the prevention, readiness, responsiveness and 
recovery systems in the event of adverse incidents threatening and affecting critical infrastructure. 
This information and expertise is also drawn from the following areas of specialisation (TISN 2004): 
• Law enforcement and crime prevention; 
• Counter terrorism; 
• National security and defence; 
• Emergency m?lnagement and the dissemination of information; 
• Business continuity planning; 
• Protective security (physical, personnel and procedUral); 
• E-security; 
• Natural disaster planning and preparedness; 
• Risk management; 
• Professional networking; 
• Market regulation, planning and infrastructure development. 
Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchical structure of the TISN, which consists of a number of advisory 
groups that all interact and network together under the auspice of the Australian Government's 
Attorney-General's Department (AGO). 
Figure 1: TISN network structure (TISN, 2004a) 
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The Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council (CIAC) oversees the Infrastructure Assurance Advisory 
Groups (IAAGs) and provides medium to long-term advice to the AGO on the national approach to 
critical infrastructure protection and deliberates on emergent issues, particularly any interdependence 
issues raised by the groups within the TISN network. CIAC is chaired by the AGD and consists of 
representatives from critical infrastructure business sectors, relevant federal, state and territory 
government agencies and the NCTC (AGO 2004). The IAAGs represent the business sector 
groupings created as a forum for respective owners and operators of critical infrastructure to meet, 
discuss and share information on common threats and vulnerabilities as well as appropriate 
information on strategies and measures to mitigate risk within their respective business sector group 
(Booth 2003). 
Under this consultative and information sharing regime, critical infrastructure stakeholders are 
expected to develop and maintain implementation plans for critical infrastructure protection that is 
aligned to the national strategy and are obligated with the following provision responsibilities (TISN 
2004b): 
• Asset security; 
• Risk management and planning processes; 
• Regular reviews of risk management and planning processes; 
• Incident reports and reporting suspicious activity to police; 
• Development and regular revision of business continuity plans; 
• Involvement in exercises that test business plans in place, as conducted by government 
authorities. 
According to Walker (2004), the development of this information sharing approach to the 
management of the security of Australia's national critical infrastructure is still in its infancy and will not 
be fully operational until early 2005. Furthermore, Fleckner's (2004) article supports the premise that 
the increase in private sector ownership of critical infrastructure necessitates that the management 
and protection of these essential services and utilities has to have a federal government led and 
coordinated approach. 
Accordingly, during the 2004 Election the government announced that would be establishing a new 
advisory group, namely the Business - Government Advisory Group on National Security to provide a 
discussion environment and mechanism to propose new security initiatives specifically focused 
around business (Loughnane 2004). 
Additionally, during the election campaign the coalition announced that a new Business Liaison Unit 
would be created under the auspice of Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). This unit 
would focus on aSSisting critical infrastructure owners, operators and members of the business 
community in accessing judicious intelligence on issues affecting the security of assets and staff 
under their responsibility (Loughnane 2004). 
Furthermore, the onus is now squarely placed upon the individual owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure to implement effective IT security regimes for Nil protection and physical security, which 
deliver best practice asset security and meets the aspirations of the TISN's critical infrastructure 
protection program (Walker 2004). 
3. The foundation of Australia's critical infrastructure model 
The critical infrastructure security management system within Australia is focused at the high-level 
end of the management spectrum and is based on information sharing committee-like structure where 
specific groups will get together to talk about their relevant security issues. The TISN structure has 
merit at this level of application, but needs to deliver further information that would assist business in 
making critical self-judgements about their specific place within Australia's critical infrastructure 
hierarchy. 
While the current TISN structure illustrated in Figure 1 gives a high-level indication of which IAAG a 
particular corporate business or organisation might be aligned with, it fails to represent an overall 
elemental view of Australia's critical infrastructure. Therefore, to resolve this ambiguous situation it is 
proposed that developing a model representing and depicting the critical infrastructure structure and 
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its elemental components will allow organisations to better identify their place within the structure, 
determine their likely security obligations and criticality, with regard to the national critical 
infrastructure hierarchy. 
The basis of Australia's critical infrastructure model will be developed from a combination of a number 
of current critical infrastructure viewpoints expressed in the literature. The first is the critical 
infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors as illustrated by the NCTC (2004) in Table 1, which clearly 
identifies the various infrastructure types that are regarded as critical to the national interest by the 
NCTC. The second is the TISN (2004a) structure illustrated in Figure 1 that presents a high-level view 
of how the various infrastructure groups, representing infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors are 
networked together. 
It is also important to recognise and incorporate the characteristics that organisational networks and 
their infrastructures can span across physical and designated borders, differing regulatory 
jurisdictions, while also engaged at differing levels within the context of Australia's critical 
infrastructure. Therefore commercial organisations need to be able to locate their place within the 
overall model of Australia's critical infrastructure to recognise 'duty of care' and governance issues, 
while also recognising where security responsibility and obligation boundaries exist, as aligned with 
the nine critical infrastructure management principles enumerated in Section 2.1 of this paper. 
4. Modelling Australia's critical infrastructure 
This model of Australia's critical infrastructure incorporates differing levels of infrastructure that 
includes the sectors and sub-sector infrastructures pertaining to each level within the model. This 
approach will clearly determine the general physical boundaries between levels and allow further 
extrapolation to identify the precise connection points between levels that will further clarify and 
delineate: infrastructure ownership; governance obligations; duty of care; maintenance; security 
management, and protection responsibil.ities. 
Additionally, a scalable model representation will further assist in identification of dependency and 
interdependency inter-relationships between infrastructure levels and their sub-sectors from the 
individual user at the personal level through to the global level. 
4.1 Sectionalising critical infrastructure into levels 
The critical infrastructure model will consist of five broad based infrastructure levels that clearly define 
the physical boundaries between each level. Within each infrastructure level will be the individual 
critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors as represented in Table 1. The infrastructure levels are 
listed as follows: 
• Global - infrastructure that extends across international boundaries or infrastructure located within 
another sovereign nation; 
• National - infrastructure that extends across state boundaries, but remains within the national 
borders; 
• State - infrastructure that is confined within the border boundaries of the respective Australian 
state's jurisdiction; 
• Corporate - infrastructure that is confined within the property boundaries of the particular 
corporate or business entity; 
• Personal - infrastructure that is not the property of any supply authority infrastructure or within the 
corporate jurisdiction. This may be regarded as domestic infrastructure. 
Upon sectionalising of Australia's critical infrastructure into the previously defined levels, as modelled 
in Figure 2, this now illustrates generally definable and recognised boundaries between the various 
critical infrastructure levels. 
As a consequence of the model sectionalisation, the issue of potential dependency inter-relationships 
that exist within the infrastructure model has to clearly define the differing types of infrastructure 
dependencies and interdependencies that add further complexity within the elemental scope of the 
critical infrastructure model. The existence of these infrastructure dependency relationships needs to 
be seriously considered due to the potentially expansive implications and possible functional impact 
they could inflict upon the availability of critical infrastructure services. Therefore it is desirable to 
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develop an approach to map and simply represent dependency and interdependency relationships 
that exist within the national critical infrastructure, thereby delivering further underpinning structural 
information support that further compliments the TISN high-level concept as it currently exists. 
4.2 Critical infrastructure dependence and interdependence 
To clearly understand the implications and meaning of the terms dependence and interdependence 
within the concept of critical infrastructure, we need to clearly define an understanding of the meaning 
and use of these terms. The term dependence is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (Pearsall, 
1998, p.495) as "the state of relying on or being controlled by someone or something else", while the 
term interdependence as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (Pearsall, 1998, p.951) as "(of two 
or more people or things) dependent on each other". 
The NCTC (2004) acknowledges that dependencies do exist and that most critical infrastructure 
operators are dependent to a varying extent on the uninterrupted supply of electricity, water, fuel, 
shared information systems and emergency services. Furthermore, infrastructure services such as: 
electricity; transport, and telecommunications are additionally dependent on the continued security of 
supply. 
Additionally, within the subject literature confusion of meaning and inter-changeability of terms exists 
in the descriptive use of the terms dependence and interdependence. The authors have proposed 
here, an attempt to clearly define and delineate the difference between the applied terms of 
dependency and interdependency. 
4.3 Critical infrastructure dependency types 
Therefore a critical infrastructure dependency can be defined as the one-way reliance or influence of 
one critical infrastructure level and/or its infrastructure sectors has on another critical infrastructure 
level and/or its sectors for continuity of supply and delivery of services. 
It is proposed that the type of critical infrastructure dependency within the model can be readily 
defined as being one of the following three types: 
• TCID (Total Critical Infrastructure Dependency) are those critical infrastructure dependencies that 
exist across all infrastructure levels modelled; 
• MCID (Multiple Critical Infrastructure Dependency) are those critical infrastructure dependencies 
that exist across three or more infrastructure levels, but not all; 
• BCID (Bridging Critical Infrastructure Dependency) are those critical infrastructure dependencies 
that exist between only two critical infrastructures levels. 
It is proposed by the authors that the dependency relationship is based on the premise that there 
exists reliance or influence from one infrastructure level or sector on another, or multiple of, for 
delivery of service and should be strictly regarded as heavily biased or one-sided relationship. If this 
relationship was a mutually reliant and the dependency was found to be more equally distributed, then 
it should be regarded as interdependency relationship. It must also be considered that these 
relationships can also exist and exert influence on critical infrastructure not only as shown in the 
model, but also at the elemental level that exists between infrastructures. 
4.4 The critical infrastructure model 
Therefore, through the development of the model of Australia's critical infrastructure as shown in 
Figure 2 this further compliments both the TISN (2004a) structure and the NCTC (2004) findings by 
clearly illustrating infrastructure levels, sectors and sub-sectors within a defined structure. Hence, 
corporate organisations will be able to utilise this to determine whether their infrastructure could be 
deemed as, either critical or non-critical. 
Additionally within the model is represented the TCID dependency relationship that exists across the 
entire model and represents the dependency that Australia's critical infrastructure has on the 
continued supply of electricity, telecommunications and information technology infrastructure as 
determined by the research of Marasea (2003). 
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Tefecommunications (Phone, Fax, Internet, Cables, Satellites), Electrooic Mass 
Communication 
Postal Services 
Defence and Intelligence Facilities, Foreign Missions 
Postal Services 
Interstate Transmissioo and Supply (Electricity, Gas, Petr~eum Fuels) 
Key Residences, Nuclear Facilities, Essential Government Departments, Houses of 
Parliament 
Buildings, CultlJral, Sport and T ouriam 
Generation, Processing and transmission (Electricity, Gas, Petroleum Fuels 
State Roads, Bridges, Tunne/s, State Rail 
Defence Industry, Heavy Industry and Chemic"'s, SCADA Systems 
Banking, InsurMce and Trading EKchanges 
Bulk Production, Storage and Distribution, Processing, Cooperating Supply Chains 
Urban Councils and Shire Councils 
Water, Waste Water and Waste" Management 
However, the specific boundaries between the infrastructure levels within the model at the lower 
. levels is still general and requires further investigation to more specifically identify and reveal the 
actual connection point between infrastructure levels, sectors and sub-sectors to establish where 
infrastructure responsibility begins and ends. 
5. Critical infrastructure boundaries 
The physical boundaries between the infrastructure levels in the critical infrastructure model at the 
global, national and state levels are clearly established and recognised. However, the physical 
boundaries of the state, corporate and personal infrastructure levels have been generalised to reflect 
the infrastructure situated within property boundaries. This demarcation point is not yet specific 
enough to represent the actual nexus point boundaries between the state, corporate and personnel 
infrastructure levels. 
5.1 Physical boundaries 
The physical infrastructure nexus point boundary between the state, corporate and personal level 
should be reflected as the actual connection point between the infrastructure service provider or 
distributor and the point of attachment onto the particular property's infrastructure, rather than at the 
property boundary. 
The precise nexus point of demarcation identified in the electricity supply industry's Australia and New 
Zealand Standard Wiring Rules AS/NZS 3000 (Australian Standards 2000), is the Point Of 
Attachment (POA), which is the specific connection point where the distributor's supply infrastructure 
is terminated onto the consumer's building and therefore corporate or personal infrastructure. For 
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such utility services as water and gas supply infrastructure, in this situation the POA would be the 
supply side of the metering point situated on the property, as shown in Figure 3. 
Similarly for telecommunication infrastructure, the same definition can be applied, but the terminology 
used in the relevant Australian Standard for the Installation Requirements for Customer Cabling 
(Wiring Rules) AS/ACIF S009:2001 (Standards Australia 2001) , refers to the Main Distribution Frame 
(MDF) as the point of attachment between the service provider infrastructure and the corporate or 
personal consumer infrastructure, as depicted in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Physical infrastructure boundaries . 
Hence, the specific nexus pOints of infrastructure boundaries clearly establish the recognised pOints of 
interconnection between the respective state, corporate and personal infrastructure levels 
The establishment and recognition of these boundaries then allows the determination of ownership, 
maintenance and security responsibilities for the infrastructures concerned. Although the use of 
wireless communication technology is used as a supporting telecommunication infrastructure, the 
physical wireless infrastructure may be located within the property boundary and the radio waves 
used in wireless technology can and do emanate beyond the ptiysical property boundary. 
5.2 Wireless boundaries 
The TISN has noted that wireless telecommunication infrastructure is progressively becoming the 
initial choice and mainstay of many corporate information service infrastructures, this is due to its 
flexible and functional nature and the perceived lack of physical restraint placed on the physical 
boundaries of wireless connectivity. However there are some limitations to wireless connectivity and 
depending on the technology used, wireless technology can be categorically placed within one the 
following four types of wireless network and its specified operational distance [TISN, 2004c]: 
• VVWAN (Wireless Wide Area Network) -10 Km; 
• WMAN (Wireless Metropolitan Area Network) - 1 Km; 
• WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network) - 100 m; 
• WPAN (Wireless Personal Area Network) - 1 m. 
Obviously, the wireless radio-frequency waves can be detected beyond the physical confines of 
buildings and property boundaries and are potentially accessible to those who are external to the 
business or organisation. Hence the protection and security of the information conveyed across these 
stray wireless radio-frequency carrier waves, becomes the responsibility of the owner of the wireless 
technology (TISN, 2004c). This then raises issues of digital ownership of information, security 
responsibility and privacy issues within the electronic communications passing across wireless 
networks and ultimately the NIL 
5.3 Digital boundaries 
Electronic communications within the Nil can pass across many individually owned infrastructures that 
may exist at any level of the infrastructure model and although the physical boundaries of 
responsibility between infrastructure levels and sectors is clear, the same cannot be said for 
identifying digital boundaries. This issue is further complicated when considering the impact of such 
issues as: communication and data security; privacy; and governance. 
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Clearly; there is a need for further research to establish digital· demarcations within critical electronic 
communication infrastructure to determine the onus of responsibility for data security, privacy, and 
governance. Unfortunately, the responsibility for securing an electronic information exchange across 
the publicly accessible Nil is not clearly defined in the Australian and New Zealand Information 
Security Management Standard (2001 a). It is suggested that an organisation owning the network 
infrastructure develop and implement adequate security policies and practices, and where this 
expertise is lacking seek external specialist advice (Standards Australia, 2001a). Although, under the 
auspice of the Telecommunications Act (1997) the security obligations related to communications is 
borne by licensed carriers and service providers, who are required to protect the confidentiality of 
information that relates to the contents of the communication and the affairs or personal particulars of 
persons related to the communication transmitted. 
While neither the Australian and New Zealand Security Management Standard (2001a) nor the 
Telecommunications Act (1997) clearly establishes any point of demarcation between differently 
owned infrastructures, the general implication is that the protection of any digital communication 
passing across any communication infrastructure, regardless of ownership, is the responsibility of the 
infrastructure owner, licenSe carrier or service provider. 
Critically, this raises issues of availability that are entrusted to interconnected infrastructures and the 
influential effect that such dependency or interdependency relationships may have on contiguous 
infrastructure. 
6. Critical infrastructure relationships 
While dependency has been defined as a heavily biased or a one-sided relationship, interdependency 
is defined as a two-way, mutually shared equality of reliance on the availability of multiple critical 
infrastructure levels, sectors or sub-sectors, which are mutually reliant on one another's availability for 
continuity of supply and delivery of services. 
To further illustrate critical infrastructure interdependency and the complexity of these interactions 
between various infrastructure sectors, Figure 4 depicts a simplified version of the potential 
complexity that exists between critical infrastructure systems with the arrows indicating where the 
interdependencies exist (PMSEIC, 2002). 
Figure 4: Critical infrastructure interdependencies simplified (PMSEIC 2002) 
The arrows in Figure 4 indicate where the interdependencies between infrastructures exist and map 
some of the more prominent interdependencies that are apparent within Australia's critical 
infrastructure (PMSEIC 2002) and whatever the complexity of the interdependency they remain a vital 
consideration to maintaining critical infrastructure service, supply and operation (Marasea 2003). 
As Figure 4 is an abstraction of high-level interdependencies, the authors propose that the utilisation 
of Entity-Relationship Diagrams (ERO) would be more beneficial in illustrating and modelling critical 
infrastructure dependency and interdependency relationships, at both the high-level infrastructure and 
the lower-level sub-sectors within the scope of the critical infrastructure model in Figure 2. 
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7. Future research towards modelling critical infrastructure inter-relationships 
As a logical development to Marasea's (2003) research, dependency relationships between critical 
infrastructures now fall within two broad areas, namely Dependency and Interdependency. It is 
proposed that these relationships can be modelled graphically utilising ERDs to provide a simplified 
abstraction of what can be a complex real-world relationship (Rob & Coronel, 1997). 
The rationale for applying the illustrative principles of ERDs is that within Systems Analysis and 
Design, ERDs have been used to graphically model the relationship between system entities 
(Satzinger et ai, 2004). Accordingly critical infrastructure dependency also characterises a relationship 
between systems and logically the same ERD principles can be transposed to illustrate the inter-
relationships between critical infrastructure levels, sectors and sub-sectors. 
The principle advantage of modelling infrastructure dependency in this manner is to present a 
simplified illustrative overview of the inter-relationship, identify where these dependencies exist, what 
relationship type they are and provide a simplified assessment of the influential extent of the 
relationship. Initially though a further comparative analysis of alternative modelling schemas is 
needed before extending further into scenario validation and simulation software (Easel) modelling 
and this is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
8. Conclusion 
The model of Australia's critical infrastructure is largely based upon a number of previously scattered 
viewpoints that are bought together to represent the basis of the model developed. In its current 
evolution the model recognises the differences that exist within critical infrastructure and attempts to 
deliver a fair representation of where in the structure, particular levels, sectors and sub-sector critical 
infrastructures are situated. This model should not be regarded as conclusive at this early stage, but 
as a starting point for further investigation, refinement and discussion in attempting to categorise 
critical infrastructures for organisations who own or operate within the setting of Australia's critical 
infrastructure. 
In recognising the relational influence between critical infrastructures, we have attempted to define 
with greater clarity the terms of dependency and interdependency to bring descriptive certainty to 
these terms used. In establishing that influential relationships exist between critical infrastructures we 
have proposed that ERD's can be applied to identify the influential inter-relationships between critical 
infrastructures in the Australian context, but recognise that further research into comparative 
relationship mapping methodologies is still needed. 
The critical infrastructure model (Figure 2) now delivers a scalable representation -that clearly 
delineates the boundaries between critical infrastructures and will assist organisations in recognising 
their criticality status, security responsibilities and obligations to critical infrastructure protection, by 
clearly establishing the physical and digital security obligations of infrastructure owners within 
Australia's critical infrastructure hierarchy. 
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